During the negotiation process, Art. 4.1 carried the subheading "Collective Long-Term Goal." The ADP2-11 draft included language describing a collective or cooperative approach as one of the bracketed options; this language persisted through most of the negotiations. But in the final text reads, the long-term goal was framed as "Parties aim to reach," suggesting an individuality that was less present in previous drafts. The long-term goal itself changed. Article 4.1's final text looks to peak global greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible, and to achieve a balance between emissions and sinks by the second half of the century. This language allows for some continued fossil fuel burning provided the emissions are absorbed by greenhouse sinks. This stands in contrast to zero emissions or a specific percentage reduction of emissions, options that were proposed in earlier versions. The balancing and peaking language is less specific than either of these options. But it is somewhat more defined than the emissions neutrality option contained in previous draft. The final text reflects language contained in IPCC reports, and is viewed as more scientific and less political. While forests and oceans serve as natural sinks, some of the balance suggested in this language likely relies on potential negative-emissions technology that would neutralize new carbon emissions. The EU has admitted that a 1.5C temperature goal is dependent upon these future technologies. The issue is that these kinds of technologies are highly speculative, and certainly unproven to work on a large scale. Finally, while the current text removed specific mention of CBDRRC, the general idea remains in the article. The global peaking language specifically recognizes that this will take longer for developing countries. The article also retained language regarding equity, sustainable development, and eradicating poverty, thus recognizing the importance of these issues alongside reducing worldwide emissions.

As noted, the primary issue with Art. 4.1 is that it relies heavily on the advancement of negative-emissions technologies, which as of yet are unproven to work on a large-scale. While this advancement is possible, whether or not it will occur at a rate quick enough and a degree large enough to keep the planet under the 1.5C is doubtful. If this becomes a reality, and negative-emissions technologies in fact are not adequate to rely upon, future negotiations will likely attempt to address this issue. If it becomes clear that we cannot rely on technology to the degree hoped, Parties will have to negotiate this language once again, perhaps steering away from the idea of a balance between sinks and emissions. There may need to be a shift away from allowing increased emissions, and towards limiting emissions altogether, regardless of the amount of sinks available. This was an option previously within the text that was heavily criticized by oil-producing countries and companies.

Concerning individual efforts, earlier drafts of Art. 4.4 included two specific options. The first option required developed country Parties and other Annex 1 Parties to undertake "quantified economy-wide absolute emission reduction and limitation commitments/targets…." This option also required that these reductions be "comparable, measurable, reportable and verifiable," cover all greenhouse gases, and be implemented without conditions. This exceedingly specific language, paired with the word "shall," offered a strong and enforceable option for holding developed countries accountable for their individual emission targets. It also offered a more lenient target for developing countries, qualifying its stipulations with "should" rather than "shall," and allowed developed countries to take into account sustainable development concerns. It also provided that effort by developing countries be supported and enabled by support from developed countries in the form of finance, technology, and capacity building. This well-developed, detailed, and strict option, however, was not chosen for the final text. The final text instead reflects the second option offered for individual efforts. It stipulates that developed countries should "continue to take the lead" for emission reductions, and rather than requiring economy wide emission reduction targets, it suggests them by qualifying these reductions with “should.” Further, it offers no specific requirements for these emission reduction targets. For developing countries the language is equally as vague, and encourages these countries to also move toward economy-wide emission reduction targets. While the current language contains language not originally in the second option that recognizes different national circumstances, it does not require or even suggest that developed countries support developing country progress. The final language for this article recognizes different targets for developed and developing country Parties, but it does not offer specific guidelines or hard requirements for either.

The final language of Art. 4.5 does not appear to be drastically different from what was proposed in earlier versions; however, the subtle differences that do exist significantly change the meaning of the text. Through a creative use of passive voice, the language shifts its focus from the party doing the acting to the party receiving the action, and essentially removes any specific requirements for any particular Party. Speaking to support for developing countries, the text reads "Support shall be provided to developing country Parties…" While the use of shall implies some kind of obligation, the text omits who is required to provide that support. In its previous form, one option for this paragraph specifically required developed country Parties (Annex I and II Parties) to provide support to developing countries. Further, this option specified what form that support would take, including financial resources, technology transfer, and capacity building. This option required that developed countries provided support to help developing countries "meet the agreed full costs incurred," suggesting that support would not be limited to specific price but would instead depend on what each developing country would have to spend to meet their mitigation obligations. Another previous option for this paragraph also implicated developed country Parties by stating that the ability of developing country Parties to implement their commitments were dependent on support from developed countries. This option also specified what form that support would take. The current text most closely resembles the second option offered for this article, which simply stated that developing country Parties are eligible for support in implementing mitigation targets. Similarly, the current text makes no specific mention of developed country Parties. Rather than making developing countries' ambitions dependent upon this support from developed countries, it simply states that such support will "allow for higher ambition…" This suggests that there is some kind of baseline to which developing country Parties should still adhere to, but that with increased support they could achieve mitigation goals beyond that baseline. So rather than requiring developed countries to support developing country’s mitigation efforts, it allows for a certain amount of leniency. It suggests that some minimal amount of mitigation targets will be met without this support, and this could be enough for some developed country Parties to forego support altogether.

There is a significant likelihood that Art. 4.5 will be revisited in future negotiation sessions. The main issue within this article is that it lacks specific requirements for developed country Parties to support developing countries. Despite containing the binding phrase "shall," it does not state requirements for developed country Parties. As climate change continues to affect developing countries more drastically, and as those counties struggle to meet mitigation and adaptation goals, the need for support from developed countries will become more evident and dire. During future COP sessions, Parties will have to find a way to balance the interests of developed and developing Parties in a way that allows developing countries to adapt and grow in the face of severe weather. This will require funding from developed countries, and the language reflecting this necessity will need to be binding.

Because parties did not agree on a common time frame for future NDCs, Arts. 4.9 and 4.10 will likely need to be negotiated at future COP sessions. The Parties will have to decide whether NDCs should all cover the same time period. Individually submitted NDCs vary in their implementation timelines. In general, the timelines for submitted NDCs vary with implementation up to 2030 or 2025 and beginning in 2020 or 2021. Some NDCs contain multi-year targets, others only one year. To better compare and track collective progress, future COP sessions will have to negotiate a common time frame for NDCs. Additionally, while the Agreement requires Parties to submit their NDCs every five years, it does not specify whether future NDCs should cover five or ten year periods. The Agreement indicated that this issue will be discussed at the first session of the CMA.

Art. 4.11 contains less language than it did initially and specifically addresses under what circumstances Parties may adjust their NDCs. While it still allows for these adjustments, it only does so for the purpose of enhancing ambition. Previously this article also contained bracketed language addressing when adjustments would be allowed to lower ambition. This bracketed language allowed developing country Parties to lower ambitions when their efforts were severely affected by extreme natural events, economic shocks, or a force majeure. This article also previously contained bracketed language giving Parties more discretion as to when they could adjust their NDCs. It allowed for this discretion depending on finance, technology development and transfer, and capacity-building support. The current text contains no allowances for lowering ambitions. This may place developing, and even developed countries, in a bind should an extreme weather event significantly impede their ability to meet mitigation goals. With the increase in extreme weather events, especially for developing countries, having a provision allowing for flexibility in meeting targets would have been extremely beneficial. Additionally, because support from developed countries for developing countries has been watered down significantly, it would have been useful for developing countries to be able to lower their targets according to specific economic concerns. Should a developing country build their targets based on potential support from developed countries and then come to find that support to be lacking, a provision allowing them to lower their targets in the future would have been worthwhile. This would have allowed developing countries to still make ambitious goals initially, with the knowledge that should future events make those goals difficult or impossible, they would be allowed to change them.

Because this article took away the option to alter NDCs for lowering ambitions, it will also likely be revisited in future COP sessions. The idea that future NDCs strive to be more ambitious than previous NDCs is obviously important to reduce future emissions. However, by not allowing for changes in the face of devastating weather events and economic catastrophe, the text ignores the precarious position that many countries are in now, or will be in the future. Without specific and ambitious support requirements from developed countries for developing countries, it may be challenging for developing country Parties to meet targets within their NDCs. It may also serve as a limit on how ambitious Parties make their NDCs. The future for many developing countries, especially low lying island nations, is uncertain. Future COP sessions will have to negotiate around this uncertainty and around the issue of whether countries (specifically developing countries) should be allowed to alter their NDCs with a view to lowering ambition levels.